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Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
 How: Subject a service to a load that 
exceeds its steady-state capacity…
 Goal: Make resource unavailable to 
legitimate users…
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Denial of Service Attacks
 Most Recent Example: Attack on SCO’s
Web site on 2/2/04 courtesy of MyDoom
 A nuisance? 
 Freedom of Expression?
 Act of Patriotism?
 How about $26.1B of lost productivity!!!
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DoS: The Good News
 Need lots of resources to mount attack
 Attack can be anticipated
 There is a Red Sox Game; stay home!
 Easy to detect intrusion/attack
 Attack signature is simple
 When was the last time you saw elephants 
crossing the BU Bridge? 
 Theoretically can trace back perpetrators
 If nothing else, getting a ticket is a deterrent—
maybe ☺
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What If…
 It takes less resources to mount attack
 Attack cannot be anticipated
 It’s just another day of gridlock on the BU Bridge
 Intrusion/attack detection is hard
 Attack signature is not as simple!
 No suspicious traffic patterns seen on bridge
 It is hard to trace back perpetrators
 Attacker is keen on not being exposed (a.k.a. 
“Reduction of Liability”, or RoL)
Î Say hello to the world of “low-rate” DoS attacks
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Prior Work: Shrew Attack [KK03]
 Goal: Cause a subset of TCP flows to 
perpetually timeout
 How: Synchronize the attack traffic to exploit 
TCP timeout mechanism
 Upon a loss of a window of packets, a TCP 
flow is forced into timeout
 minRTO is lower bounded by 1 sec 
[RFC2988]
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Our Work: RoQ Attacks
 Goal: “Bleed” the system of its capacity by 
forcing it to operate in its most inefficient 
region—with minimal exposure
 How: “Exploit” built-in load adaptation 
mechanisms to make the system perpetually in 
a transient state—unstable
 Hint: Make other drivers brake when they 
should accelerate and accelerate when they 
should brake. Just be a Boston driver ☺
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Our Work: RoQ Attacks
Any adaptation 
TCP/AQM; BGP; 
Admission Control; 
Load Balancers; 
sensor coordination
TCP flows 
using timeout 
mechanisms
Any system
Web Servers; DNS; 
Internet Routers
What it 
targets
Harder
Spoofing can be 
used for both 
source and 
destination
Hard
Transients could 
occur under normal 
operation; gridlock 
on the bridge
Few
Attack goal is to 
maximize damage 
while minimizing 
exposure
Adaptation
Dynamics
RoQ
Hard 
Spoofing can be 
used
Easy
Elephants spotted 
periodically
Depends on 
targeted 
victims’ RTT
TCP 
Timeout 
Mechanism
Shrew
Easy
Find elephant 
owners!
Easy
Watch for 
elephants!
Lots
Find Elephants and 
herd them to bridge
Steady-
stateDoS
Trace-
back
Intrusion 
detection
What it 
needs
What it 
Exploits
Azer Bestavros Exploiting Transients of Adaptation for RoQ Attacks on Internet Resources 9
Adversarial Exploits of Adaptation
 Adaptation mechanisms are built under 
an assumption of a non-adversarial loads
 Examples: random traffic patterns, random 
arrival processes, etc.
 Questions:
 What load patterns would be most virulent 
to a given adaptation scheme?
 How much adversarial load would it take to 
make adaptation harmful?
 …
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RoQ Attack: Definition
 RoQ Attacks maximize the marginal utility of 
attack traffic Î Potency
 Many Possible Instantiations 
 Damage = Rejected requests, response time, wasted BW
 Cost = Injected requests, # of attackers, attack BW
 Aggressiveness = Tolerance to exposure
 Large Omega Î Largest level of aggression
 Small Omega Î Minimal exposure
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Adversarial Exploits of Adaptation
 We considered three examples of RoQ:
 Congestion Control in Networks
 Admission Control for Web Servers
 Load Balancing in CDNs
 Many other vulnerabilities exist
 Dynamic routing (e.g., BGP)
 Power conservation in sensor networks
 Hard to find systems that would be safe!
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 Adopted Kelly’s optimization framework
 Maximize users’ utilities subject to  the network’s 
capacity constraints [K99]
 Primal source algorithm
RoQ: Fundamental Concept
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P2
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 Link price functions reflect prices fed back 
to sources as the load on the links varies
 Convergence and stability can be proved 
through Lyapunov function [K99]
RoQ: Fundamental Concept
Load/Demand
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 RoQ attacks will hinder convergence
 Can destroy the “contractive mapping”
of the pricing function
RoQ: Fundamental Concept
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 Potency can be computed as 
a function of the convergence  
 Example
 Optimal attack exists that 
maximizes the potency
RoQ: Fundamental Concept
Damage
Cost
P1 P2
Azer Bestavros Exploiting Transients of Adaptation for RoQ Attacks on Internet Resources 16
Network Adaptation: Part Un
A packet loss = congestion signal
 AIMD Control
 No packet loss
Î increase sending rate linearly
 Packet loss
Î decrease sending rate exponentially
 Timeout
 Nothing is going through
Î shut off for exponentially longer periods of time
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Network Adaptation: Part Deux
 What generates a loss?
 No space in router queue (a.k.a. DropTail)
 Drop packet if queue builds up (a.k.a. RED)
 RED as example of Active Queue Mgmt
 Tries to avoid “herding behavior” by 
randomizing packet losses across flows and 
by relating loss probability to queue length
Azer Bestavros Exploiting Transients of Adaptation for RoQ Attacks on Internet Resources 18
Premise of a RoQ & RoL Attack
1. RoQ: Attacker sends packets at high rate—
enough to cause lots of flows to slow down 
exponentially fast (e.g., by halving their 
sending rate)
2. RoL: Attacker shuts off
3. Resource will be underutilized until flows “rev-
up” their sending rate, which is a slow linear 
process by design
4. Go back to 1…
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 A simple “square wave”
 Values of δ, τ, and T will depend on 
setting—stay tuned…
Attack Pattern
t
T » ττ
y(t)
δ
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 Modeled as a set of difference equations 
for a set of n flows, each subject to a 
feedback control  loop
Network Adaptation: RED+TCP
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Network Adaptation: Router
 Instantaneous buffer size 
S R
C
b(t)
αiDi
xi(t)
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Network Adaptation: RED
 Queue (EWM) Average Size
 Loss Rate
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Network Adaptation: TCP
 Sending Rate Evolution (a la AIMD)
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Network Adaptation: RED+TCP
 Model can be instantiated and numerical 
results obtained
Attack Starts Here Attack Period
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Model Validation: RED Simulation
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RED versus DropTail
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How Bad Is It?
Exposure/Aggressiveness Index
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“Really”, How Bad Is It? 
 Can This Really Happen? It Did…
Attack Sink Attack Source
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Implementation Results
Long RTT = 120 msec
Short RTT = 15 mec
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Implementation Results
Long RTT = 120 msec
 Harder to time-out [shrew]
Short RTT = 15 mec
1.6Mbps Shrew Attack [KK03]
8.08 Mbps Î 1.25 Mbps 
Π = 4.2
0.37Mbps RoQ Attack
8.08 Mbps Î 3.6 Mbps 
Π = 12
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It is even scarier…
 Could be mounted as a distributed RoQ
 Time multiplexed
 Traffic multiplexing 
 Traceback is that much harder!
 Spoofing source addresses
 Attack sink does not even have to exist!
Any source! Any Destination!
Victim Link
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Steeling Quality (vs bandwidth)
… or how to make a RED link look like a DropTail link?
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Tuning Attack Parameters
Could be done using an on-line controller
t
τ
δ
T
T
δτ =5
δ
m=20
δ
δτ =5
Po
te
n
cy
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Adversarial Exploits of Adaptation
 We considered three examples of RoQ:
 Congestion Control in Networks
 Admission Control for Web Servers
 Load Balancing in CDNs
 Many other vulnerabilities exist
 Dynamic routing (e.g., BGP)
 Power conservation in sensor networks
 Hard to find systems that would be safe!
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Admission Control
 A “Gate” used to protect from overload
 Admit (cross the bridge ☺)
 Reject (into the river /)
 Postpone
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Admission Control Adaptation
 Admission Controller
 What percentage of requests should be 
admitted?
 Calculated based on the deviation between 
the server’s state and a target value
 PI Controller, AIMD Controller, etc…
 Feedback Monitor
 Measures the server’s state and report it 
back to the Controller
 Feedback delay
7Azer Bestavros Exploiting Transients of Adaptation for RoQ Attacks on Internet Resources 37
Admission Control Adaptation
 Modeled as a discrete time system
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Admission Control: Model
 Controller: Proportional Integrative (PI)
 Gate
Error Signal
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Server: Model
 Pending requests
Load/Utilization Utilization/Service Rate
Thrashing Index
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RoQ Attack Premise
1. RoQ: Attacker sends requests at high rate in a 
very small period of time, enough to push the 
server into overload
2. RoL: Attacker shuts off
3. Admission control will shut off subsequent 
legitimate requests. Since the system is 
thrashing, recovery will take a longer time
4. Go back to 1…
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RoQ Attack Pattern
 A simple “square wave”
t
T » ττ
y(t)
δ
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 Model can be instantiated and solved
 Large potencies possible “theoretically”
Admission Control Adaptation
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Implementation Setup
 Server: Minihttpd
 Admission Control
 Forks a cgi script
 Access 1MB
 ~ 20 msec
 Clients: Httperf
 Utilization
 Memory utilization = Used / Total
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Implementation Results
Attack Start at 120 (, 740, …) with 
800 requests; system recovers only 
at time 500 (, 1120, …)
Potency depends on controller 
settings (e.g., gain) and other system 
characteristics
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Implementation Results
 Effect of Feedback Delay
 Real Delay
 Averaging (EWMA)
 Limitations
 Linux alleviates thrashing: It Kills threads 
making collecting of data real hard
Î Only able to cause moderate thrashing
 Limitation on number of open connections 
generated by Httperf
Î Only able to use 4 machines
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Take Home Messages
 RoQ Attacks Exploit Dynamics: 
It is NOT capitalizing on a static property of a 
protocol—unlike the “shrew” attack which 
causes perpetual timeouts
 RoQ Attacks Trade off Damage and Cost:
It is NOT aiming to take a resource down at 
any cost, but rather it is aiming to get the 
maximum damage per attack byte
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Food For Thought…
 More elaborate attacks
 Complex attack patterns
 Are there fundamental tradeoffs?
 RoQ tolerance versus utilization/delay/fairness
 Other adaptation susceptibilities
 Routing algorithms, sensor nets, …
 Countermeasures
 Randomized adaptation
 Intrusion detection
 Traceback http://www.cs.bu.edu/groups/wing
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